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SUMMARY
This paper presents estimates of static and dynamic general equilibrium
resource allocation effects for four alternative plans for corporate and
personal income tax integration in the U.S. A medium—scale numerical general
equilibrium model is used which integrates the U.S. tax system with consumer
demand behavior by household and producer behavior by industry.
Results indicate that total integration of personal and corporate taxes
would yield an annual static efficiency gain of around $4 billion (1973
dollars). Partial integration plans yield less. Dynamic effects are larger,
and our analysis indicates that full integration may yield gains whose present
value is as large as $400 billion or 0.8% of the discounted present value of
the GNP stream to the U.S. economy after correction for population growth.
Plans differ in their distributional impacts, although these findings depend
on the nature of replacement taxes used to preserve government revenues. The
size of dynamic resource allocation effects are sensitive to the choice of
the replacement tax, while static gains are reasonably robust.
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(415) 497—4108This paper presents estimates of static and dynamic general
equilibrium resource allocation effects for four alternative plans
for corporate and personal income tax integration in the U.S. A
medium—scale numerical general equilibrium model is used which integrates
the U.S. tax system with consumer demand behavior by household and
producer behavior by industry.
Results indicate that total integration of personal and corporate
taxes would yield an annual static efficiency gain of around $6 billion
(1973 dollars). Partial integration plans yield less. Dynamic effects
arelarger, and our analysis indicates that fullintegrationmayyield
gains whose present value is as large as $400 billion or 1.0% of the
discounted present value of the GNP stream to the U.S. economy after
correction for population growth. Plans differ in their distributional
impacts, although these findings dependon the nature of replacement
taxes used to preserve government revenues. The size of dynamic resource
allocation effects are sensitive to the choicfe of the replacement tax,
while Static gains are reasonably robust.
I. The Taxation of Corporate Income
A corporate tax which operates separately from the personal income
taxis widely acknowledged to lead to a number of problems. It creates
a ttdoubletI taxation ofcorporate income. Dividendsare paid out of
netof corporatetax profits andarefurther taxed under the personal
incometax. Retained earnings, to the e:tent they are capitalized in
highershare values, are also taxed twice, althoughonly fractionally
12
and on a deferred basis by the personal incon tax. This double taxation
may reduce overall rates of return and adversely affect capital accumu—
latiori.A second problem is often referred to as the ttlO_iflIt effect.
The efficiency of capital markets is iaired due to the deferral advantage
given to retained earnings; firms can reinvest retained earnings in
projects with a low yield and their shareholders can still earn a higher
net of tax return than if the funds were distributed as dividends and
reinvestedelsewhere. Thirdly, since only equity returns are subject to
corporate taxes, there is a bias towards debt finance, potentially dis-
torting corporate financial policies. Finally, the corporate tax
introduces higher effective tax rates in soms industries than others,
due to special provisions in the corporate tax law and to the varying
degreestowhich industries are incorporated. These tax rate differentials
1 further disrupt an efficient allocation of capital.Integration plans
seek to remove or mitigate these features by linking personal income
tax liabilities of stockholders (either on dividends or on all earnings)
to the corporate tax liabilities of the firms.
A variety of plans have been proposed over theyears, but these
typicallymove only part way to a full integration of personal and
corporate taxation.The coon objective of allthesetax integration
plansis to improvethe efficiency of the ecOnomythrough beneficial
resourcereallocation in both a static and a dynamic sense. In this
paper four corporate tax integration alternatives are considered, each
differing in the extent to which they remove the undesirable features
of the present corporate income tax mentioned above.3
Plan 1: Total Integration: Under this alternative the corporate
incometax is eliminatd, andthepersonal income tax is modified to
tax total shareholder earnings rather than just dividends. When capital
gains are realized, the tax basis is set at the original purchase price
plus the retained earnings cumulated during the holding period. This
last feature avoids a double tax on retained earnings capitalized in
higher stock prices. However,if the basis is notre—setfor inflation,
the base for capital gains tax will include pure nominal appreciation.
This amounts to a capital wealth levy. We evaluate this partnership
integration plan with and without inflationindexationof capital gains.
Thesetotal integration plans are the most comprehensive we consider
and contain modifications to the income tax which, if they had originally
been made, wouldhavedispensed with the need for a separate corporate
tax. Industrial distortions through the corporate taxareremoved as
is the corporate tax distortion of interteniporal consumption choice.
Plan 2: Dividend Deduction fromCorporateIncome Tax Base: This
approachsimply removes the "double" taxation of dividends by making them
deductible from taxable corporate income. Capital gains taxation of
individualsis unaltered, and the corporate income taxiseffectively
convertedinto a tax on retained earnings only. If current differences
in- retention policies by industryremain, then some industrialdiscrixn—
ination would continue within the corporate tax.
Plan 3: Dividend Deduction from Personal Income Tax Base: An
alternativeway of removing "double" taxation of dividendsis to allow
adividend deduction fromthepersonal income tax rather than from the
corporate income tax. Capital gains taxation is againunaltered.Under4
thisplan, all corporate earnings are taxed at the corporate tax rate,
and none are taxed at the persona]. 1ncoa tax rate. As with Plan 2,
underdifferent retention policies by industry, soa industrial discrim-
ination will remain under the corporate tax.
Plan 4: Dividend "Gross Up": This was the plan most actively
discussed in the U.S. tax reform debate during 1977. It seeks to
reduce rather than remove the double taxation of dividends. Part of
theincome tax paid by corporations isgiven as an income tax credit
tostockholders when dividends are distributed.2 The credit istaxable,
hence the description "gross up." Because of the partialnature of the
credit, none of the distortions listed above can be wholly removed.
II. A General Equilibrium Model of the
U.S. Economy and Tax Systern
The implementation of an integration plan results in changes
Inall relative prices in the economy due to the realignment ofindustry
tax rates; both short andlong—runequilibrium quantities will also
change. Intertemporal decisions will be re—evaluated with a changed
rate ofreturnto capital, and the divisionoftime between labor and
leisurewill be altered. The relative positions ofgroups within the
household sector will change, and therefore a complete evaluation of
integration plans should incorporate the interacting nature of the
efficiency and distributional effects involved. While a new post—•
integration tax system may involve uniform tax rates andmay be easy to
evaluate, the existing tax system is nonuniform. Implementation ofany
corporate tax integration plan will result in a new set of effectivetax3
rates on capital income by industry and onpersonalincome by consumer
group, and all equilibrium prices andquantitiescanbeexpected to
vary;the direct effectsintended froman integration plan can be
offset or reinforced by induced changes in economic behavior.
Because these induced effects are multiple, nonmarginal, and
interlinking, general equilibrium analysis is a natural technique to
use in evaluating the combination of distributionaland efficiency
changes.A medium-size general equilibrium tidelofthe U.S. economy
andtax system, estimated using 1973data,is used to analyze the
four corporate and personal income tax integration plans. It combines
atreatment of theU.S.tax system with competitive consumer and producer
behavior.Equilibrium prices and quantities are determined *ader each
integration plan, and the effects of alternative taxation regimes are
evaluated.The ide1 possesses a capability for analyzing theimpacts
of many different tax proposals concerningnot only corporate taxes,
but also, income, social security, sales,property and other taxes.
It incorporates a labor—leisure choice,savings and investment, foreign
trade,and government purchase policies. The fullrangeof taxes
currently operating in the U.S. areincorporated into the iide1. Both
single—periodandmulti—periodbehavior can be considered. Indynamic
analyses,a sequence of single—period equilibria iscomputed, with capital
stocks andlaborsupply changing over time. A labor forcegrowth rate of
appro)d.mately 2.75 percent per year in efficiency.mits isused. The precise
numberischosenso as to guarantee that the U.S.economy is on an assumed6
balanced growth path in terms of the 1973 data we use. Savings decisions
in each period are based on myopic expectations on the rate of retuni
tocapital; only in a steady state are these expectations correct.
Nineteen producer good industries, 16 consur expenditure
items, and 12 consumer types classified by income range are identified
and shown in Table 1. These dimensions are governed by a trade—off
between model complexity, data availability, and computationalexpense.
Capital and labor services are the primary factor inputs used by
industry, and these are owned by consumer groups in different proportions.
These two factors are zobile between industries, and their use is
dictatedby the zero profit conditions of perfectly competitive markets.3
Over time the capital service endowment cangrow through investment,
andthe labor service endowment changes through labor force growth. A
labor—leisure choice for households also enters the model. More details
on the structure and specification of the model and its data are given
inFullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley (l979).
II.A Data Sources and Procedures
The ndel requires the assembly of a comprehensive and consistent
microeconomjc data set. Such a data set has not been constructed before
for the U.S., but is essential for general equilibrium analysis of tax—
ation policy.4 This data set provides information on factor use by
industry (and taxes paid for these), intermediate use of products, outputs
of both producer and consumer goods, purchases of consumer goodsby
household types, incomes by source and by household type, income taxes
paid, and several other items such as business investment and foreign
trade.The complete 1973data Set used tocalibrate the model is derived7
TABLE 1
Classification of Industries, Consumer Expenditures,








1. Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fisheries
2. Mining
3. Crude Petroleum and Gas
4. Contract Construction
5. Food and Tobacco
6. Textiles, Apparel, Leather
Products
7. Paper and Printing
8. Petroleum Refining
9. Chemicals and Rubber
10. Lumber, Furniture, Stone














8. Clothing and Jewlery
9. Transportation




13. Reading, Recreation, misc.
14. Nondurable-Nonfood Household
Items








(Households classified by $thousands of 1973




fromfive major sources including the July,l976 Survey of Current
Business, unpublished worksheets of the U.S. Commerce Department's
National Income Division, the CommerceDepartment's Bureauof
Economic Analysis Input/Output tables, the U.S. Labor Department's
1973Consumer Expenditure Survey, and the U.S. Treasury Department's
merged tax file.
Inconsistencies between'these data sets and general equilibrium
conditions are resolved using systematic adjustment procedures described
inFullerton, Shoven andWhalley (1978). Effective tax rates and
parameters for equations in the model are estimated from the benchmark
equilibrium data set so as to replicate the consistent 1973 data base.
Economic effects of each tax policy proposal are then estimated by
changing the tax rates and recalculating a simulated equilibrium.
II.BProduction
Eachindustry produces a single producer good from a combination
of capitalservices, labor services, andthe outputs of other industries.
Factor input decisions are assumed to be made on the basis of cost
minimization, and these decisions are affected by the tax system since
the relative producer prices of inputs are altered for each industry
bytaxes.
The use of primary factors by each industry is described by a
separate C.E.S. or Cobb—Douglas production function. The model embodies
a capability for preselection of functional form in addition to selection
of parameter values. The intermediate use of products by industries is
described by a conventional fixed coefficient input—output matrix. This
matrix is derived from published 1970 input—output data for the U.S. and.9
updated to 1973. No substitution between primary factors and inter-
mediateinputs is permitted.
A number of ttlegalft taxation instruments are treated as
production taxes and directly affect costs of industries. The corporate
income tax, corporate franchise tax, and the property tax are in
combinationtreated as ad valorem taxes on the use of capital services.
The social security tax,unemploymentinsurance, and public workman's
compensationare treated as ad valorem taxes on the use of labor serivces.
It is, of course, debatable whether these treatments are appropriate. Some
recentliterature argues for treating the social security tax as a
benefit—related contribution andfortreating the corporate income tax
as a lump—sum tax or as a taxonthe use of equityinstruments.Our
model abstracts from these controversies, but we are aware of them.
In addition to taxes on the use of primary factors, the model
includestaxes onthe intermediate useofproducer goods by industry
andtaxes on outputsof producer goods. Intermediate input taxes
includethe registration fees paid on motorvehicles for business use;
producer output taxes include the Federal manufacturers' excise taxes,
paidby purchases for intermediate or final use. Table 2 describes the
detailed treatment of all these taxes along with an outline of the entire
United States tax system.
II.CConsumption
Within the personal sector, twelve consumer groups are identified
by their family gross of tax income as reported in the 1973 Consumer
Expenditure Survey data published by the U.S. Department of Labor. The































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































size, but other consumer groupings could be considered by the approach.
Additional characteristics, such as family size, age, maritalstatus
of household heads, andregionallocation could be examined, as done by
Piggott and Whalley (1977) In their del of the U.K. tax system.
The income of each consumer group in any period is determined
by the ownership of labor andcapitalservices and receipt of transfer
income, such as social security payxnents, from the government. Demands
forthe consumer goods, savings and leisure are assumed to be generated
by utility maximization subject to the household budget constraint.
The nested utility function is given by
15A
(1) U(u( TIX. ,L),Cf) 1=11
whereu is a C.E.S. function determining the allocation of current
expenditures between consumption goods X.and leisureL, while the
purchasedecisions on the X. are determined by a Cobb—Douglas sub—utility
function as shown. The elasticity of labor supply with respect to the
real after tax wage is set at +0.15 (Lewis, 1975).U is another
C.E.S. function, determining the allocation of income between those
currentexpenditures and expected fubure consumption Cf. Thedemand for.
Cf results in aderived demand for savings, where the elasticity of
savingswith respectto the real net—of—tax rate of return Is taken as
.4,consistent with the recent estimates by Boskin (1978).
Demands for the 19 producer goods are derived from the demands
for the 16 consumer expenditure items using a "G"transition matrix.
Anelement g1. of this matrixis the atiuntof producergood I needed
toproduce one unit of consumer expenditure item j.The distinction we
make between producer and consumer goods enables us to simultaneously
usenational accounts data on a producer good classification andthe12
andthe recently released 1972—73 Consumer Expenditure Survey defined
for consumer goods. The G transition matrix solves the problem of
distinguishing consumer demands for outputs of the trade and transpor-
tation industries from the demands for goods purchased at retail. Each
consumergood requires some trade and transportation for its production.
It also solves the problem of rare consumer purchases of goods such as
"mining"output.
The 16thconsumer expenditure Item is savings, and the G matrix
permits usto treat it like other goods. We assume that the demand
for savings depends upon the current rate of return on capital, given by
thecurrent price ofcapital services relative to the purchase price of
newcapital goods.5 We thus assume myopic expectations in the sense that
the current rental and purchase price of capital is expected to prevail
inallfuture periods. Actual patterns of investment good purchases
are the basis for constructing the co1ui of the transitionmatrix which
converts the consumer's demand for savings into demands for producer
goods. This treatment assumes an equality between savings and investment.
Savings of one period result in an equl—proportional increase in the
capital service endowment of households where the conversion between net
investmentandcapital service units uses a real net—of—tax rate of
return of 4 percent.
Progressive personal Income taxes are incorporated by a sequence
of linear tax function for each consumer. With an intercept that is
usuallynegative and a marginal tax rate applied to all income, we can13
replicate observed 1973 tax payments and still subject income changes
to the appropriate marginal rate. State and local income taxes are
nxdelled as "piggyback" or percentage surcharge taxes applied to the
Federal levy.
Treatment of persona]. income taxes is complicated by the need
to recognize the preferential treatment of certain types of capital
income. Corporate retained earnings which are converted to capital
gains have a lower present value tax liability than do earnings paid
as dividends. Similarly, the extent to which capita]. earnings are
sheltered by the unincorporated Investment Tax Credit will differ by
industry. Thus, the effective personal income tax rate on capital
income will differ by industry. Later we discuss the procedure used
to introduce these preferential tax rates on some personal capital
income, and we discuss their treatment in our ndelling of the
integration plans.
Government purchases are derived from a Cobb—Douglas demand
function defined over producer goods. Government real expenditures
are assumed to equal tax receipts less transfers since the general
equilibrium approach requires that the government budget must be
balanced. The foreign trade sector receives a simple treatment in order
to close the ixdel. By assuming that the net value of exports less
imports for each producer good remains constant, we can calculate the
net quantity transactions at any given vector ofproducerprices and
transform domestic demands to market demands.14
i. Corporate Financial Policies and
the Lock—In Effect
-
Thereare two important aspects of corporate tax integration
which our xidel does not directly consider, although we have made some
effortsto examine the sensitivity of our findings to alternative
assumptions on these issues. One problem is the role of corporate
financialpolicies and the other is the so—called "lock—in" effect.
In recent years a number of authors (Stiglitz, 1973, 1976; King,
1974) have emphasized a view of the corporate taxas a differential tax
onthe various financial instruments available for transferring capital
income from firms to individuals. Under this view there are three
different ways by which capital income of corporations can be "paid" to
the owners of capital: through interest payments, dividends, and
retentions which are assumed to be converted into capital gains. Each
of these instruments has tax and non—tax advantages and disadvantages
that govern their relative use by industry. By using debt finance,
interest is deductible from the cotporate tax base. This tax advantage
is counteracted by the disadvantage that a heavily debt financedcompany
hasa higher probability of bankruptcy and/or takeover. Equity financing
cannot avoid corporate taxation but may result in a large reduction in
personal taxes if a retention policy is employed. Alternatively, though
they have no tax advantage, dividends maybepaid for a variety of other
reasons.
Forthe purposes of the present paper, the important point is
that with changes in tax law, fir-mscanbe expected to idify their
financial policies. For example, if Plan 2 (dividend deductionfrom the13
corporate tax) encourages firms to pay out all earnings in dividends,
then Plan 1 (total. integration) and Plan 2 are identical in their effects.
Lacking good estimates of financial policy elasticity parameters,
we examine various extretre behavioral reactions and calculate the effects
of the tax change given the assumptions involved. We thus cannot claim
a "true" general equilibrium treatnt of corporate financial policies
since adjustments are made to the dividend/retention ratio to estimate
vdel equivalent tax rates before we make our general equilibrium
calculation.
-Withthe "lock—in" effect, the issue is that the deferral advantage
under-the existing personal and corporate tax structure gives a tax
preference to retention by existing firms. New firms entering financial
markets must borrow at higher interest rates than those at whichexisting
firms can implicitly borrow through retentions. Thus, if existing firms
are slower growing and less efficient, the proper reallocation of
resources to new firms need not take place.
Since we consider a general equilibrium model with constant
returns to scale technology, we do not incorporate an explicit theory
of individual firm behavior, and a reallocation of capital between firms
within an industry does not affect the industry production function. We
ar therefore unable to incorporate efficiencyaspects of the lock—in effect.
The resource allocation effects of corporate and personal tax
integration we consider are restricted to interindustry and intertempora].
distortions. Interindus try distortions enter through differential
capital incorre tax rats by industry, and intertemporal distortions affect
savings behavior in the economy and change capital allocation over time.16
IV. Representing the Tax Integration Plans in
Model Equivalent Form
Each of the tax integration plans described in SectIon I ía
represented inmodel equivalentformforthe purposes of analyzing its
general equilibrium impacts. For each plan we calculate a new set of
appropriateeffective tax rates and use these tocompute a simulated
equilibriumfor comparison with the data generated by the model under
a no policy change situation.
We first calculate each industry's capital income net of
corporate income tax, corporate franchise tax, and property tax. For
each of the twelve consumer classes,data on marginal tax rates r.
areobtained from the Treasury Department's merged tax file and a
weighted average marginal tax rate tiscalculated.
Foreach of the nineteen industries and government, we define
a fraction, f1,which denotes the proportion of that sector's capital
incomewhich is subject to full personal income taxation. The average
fraction of capital which is fully taxable by the personal income tax
is denoted f. The f. fraction differs across industries for a number 1
ofreasons, but primarily because of their different dividend and
retention policies. In addition to the corporate income tax, corporate
franchise tax, and property tax, we add another factor tax at the
industrial level, termed the personal factor tax, and collected at
rates tf by industry
The personal income tax applied to capital income at the consumer
level is given by
(2)t
=(t. — j=1,1217
where is the capital income received by the consumer class.
Theseconsumer income taxes on capital income are both positive and
negative and when aggregated over the twelve consumer classes yield
no revenue. The modelled system operates exactly as a withholding
system under which each industry pays tax onof the capital used,
at rate T.Theconsumer income taxes in expression (2) correct the
tax rate for each consumer clash (those with rates above rpay more
taxeswhilethose belowgetrefunds). Since Tischosen as the capital
weightedaverage of marginal tax rates, the corrections sumtozero.
Tocalculate thef1, we makeuse of data on capital income
types by industry, examining corporate profits (dividends and retained
earnings), netinterest payments (monetary and imputed), net rent
payments(including the imputed net rent from owner—occupied homes),
and the return to capital used innoncorporate business. Eachtype of
capitalincome is treated differently by thepersonalincome tax, and
eachhas a proportion g which is fully taxable by it. Anindustry's
f. is the weighted average of theseg proportions, and each industry
hasdifferent weights or amounts.of these capitalincome types.
Interestand rents are fully taxed under the personal income
tax. For the housing industry, imputed net rents ofowner—occupied
homesare not taxable. In 1973 the government's revenueloss due to
the$100 dividend exclusion from the personal incometax was estimated
at $285 million.6 We divide this by Ttoget an estimate of nontaxable
dividends, $1164 million. Since total dividends paid is$24,631 million,
theproportion taxable is .96 and this figure is used as theg applied
todividends,18
In the case of capital gains;Bailey(1969) has shown that close
toone—half of long term capital. gains are realized in a relatively
short period, while the remainder is held for varying durations,
averaging perhaps 35 years or more. Weighing.. the advantages of exiusion
and deferral in light of these observations on holding periods leads to a
conclusion that about 25% of nominal capital gains are effecive1y included
in the base of the personal inco tax. Accounting for inflation, however,
we calculate that 73% of real capital gains in 1973 were fully taxed at the
personal level, implying .73 as our g for retained earnings, g.
Each of the four integration plans imply different values for f
and for capital tax rates. Because of the government's balanced budget,
however, it is important that they receive the same real tax revenue in
the simulated equilibrium. Otherwise, the change in the pattern of
government expenditures and transfers would affect the outcome and prevent
the isolation of the effects of the capital tax rate changes. Tax rates
under each plan are therefore modified during computation until the
resulting equilibrium tax yield allows government to make the same real
purchases and give the same real transfers to consumer groups, based on
Laspeyres price indices.7 Different yield preserving taxes, both on
personal income and on capital income by industry, are considered. In
dynamic analyses we consider equal yield tax replacements on a period by
period basis.
Themodifications used in our model to represent each plan are
as follows:19
Plan 1: Total Integration: Under this plan, the undesirable
features of the corporate tax are removed bymergingthecorporate
income tax andpersonalincome tax. Corporate taxes are eliminated
from the numerator of the new capital tax rate calculation.The
personal income tax is changed to tax earnings rather thanjust
dividends, implying a g set to one and therefore changes in the
values of the f1 parameters. These changes implynew personal factor
taxes andthusnew capital tax rates by industry.
Plan2: Dividend Deduction from Corporate Tax Base:This
plan's corporate income tax base is undistrjbutedprofits of corporations.
It is represented in model equivalent terms foreach industry by removing
a portion i.of the corporate tax paid from the 1973capital taxation
figures and recalculating the capital tax rate. Theportion of corporate
tax removed isgiven by the ratio of dividends to net of taxcorporate
profitsby industry(Survey ofCurrent Business, July, 1976). Neither
thef1 northe personal income tax functionchange.
Plan 3: Dividend Deduction from PersonalIncome Tax Base: This
plan removes the taxation of dividends from theredistributive power
of the income tax system. In modelequivalent terms, it is specified
by considering the effect of dividenddeductibility on the income tax
functions of households. The value of theg proportion of dividends
taxable by the personal incometaxis settozero and allare
recalculated. Other adjustments areanalogous to the description of Plan 1.
Plan4:Dividend"Gross Up": This scheme givesstockholders an
income tax credit of a. 15% portion of thecorporatetaxespaid by their
firm. Itis mostsatisfactorilymodelledas a reduction in corporate20
taxes of each industry by the aximt of the credit. This ainoimtis
then treated as additional dividends in the calculation of new f1
values. The new effective tax rates then include 85% of corporate
income taxesand the new personal factor taxes. The higher dividends
relative to retained earnings result in higher f andfvalues so that
consunrs experience an increase in taxable capital income. Thetaxable
nature of the credits are thus captured.
V. Results
Tables 3and 4 presentstatic efficiency anddistributional
resultsfrom the integration plans. Table 5 presents our calculation
of dynamic effects. Although it is not arealistic policy proposal,
we also report, as abasis of comparison, results from complete
equalization of capital tax rates by industry i.mder anequal government
revenueconstraint. In this case we eliminate tax discrimination on
capitaluse among industries, use a single tax rate for all industries,
and equally tax all capital income at the personal income tax level.
Capital tax rates are set to a common rate providing government with
enoughrevenue to make the same real purchases, and f parameters are
all reset to f, the overall fraction of capital income which is
effectively fully taxed by the personal income tax system. The result-
ingefficiency gains are larger than those of the four integration plans
andrepresent the maximum possible increase in expanded national income
from the elimination of interindustry capital tax distortions.
The static measures of efficiency displayed in Table 3 are the
changes in national income plus leisure valued at pre and postpolicy
change prices. We use these quantity indices rather than compensating21
TABLE 3
Change inRealExpanded* National Income under
VariousAssumptions
(inbillions of 1973 dollars)
TaxReplacement Price Index Types of Scaling to Preserve Tax Yield
Scale ConmonRate
Equalcapital tax Paasche (lower bound) 7.377 rates on industry** Laspeyres (upper bound) 10.220
Geometricmean 8.682
Plan 1 Lump—sumMultiplicativeAdditive
Fullintegration Paasche (lower bound) 10.029 5.282 5.448 with indecing Laspeyres (upper bound)12. 363 7.292 7.446
Geometric mean 11.135 6.206 6.369
Plan 1 Paasche (lower bound) 8.883 5.120 5.223 Full integration Laspeyres (upper bound)10.628 6.646 6.748 without inded.ng Geometric mean 9.716 5.833 5.936
Plan 2 Paasehe (lower bound) 4.864 2.713 3.253
Dividend deduction from Laspeyres (upper bound)5.268 3.021 3.598 corporate income tax Geometricmean 5.061 2.862 3.42].
Plan2 Paasche (lower bound) 10.236 5.284 5.470 With extreme behaviorLaspeyres (upper bound)12. 716 7.418 7.588 assumption Geometric mean 11.408 6.260 6.442
Plan 3 Paasche (lower bound) 3.720 2.440 2.500 Dividend deduction from Laspeyres (upper bound)3.964 2.653 2.706 personal income tax Geometric mean 3.840 2.544 2.600
Plan3 Paasche (lower bound) 5.611 2.992 3.151 With extreme behavior Laspeyres (upper bound) 6.367 3.642 3.777 assumption Geometric mean 5.977 3.301 3.449
Plan 4 Paasche (lower bound) 3.590 2.681 2.712
Dividend Gross—up Laspeyres(upper bound)3.748 2.820 2.850
Geometricmean 3.668 2.749 2.780
*
Thisincorporates the change in the valuation of leisure through inducedvariations
in labor supply. Additive and multiplicativescaling refer to the marginal tax rates of thepersonal income tax system.
**
Theseresults are for complete equalization of capital taxrates by industry
(including property tax, corporate franchisetax, investment tax credit, etc.) They
are presented for comparison purposes.22
or equivalentvariations because the utility contribution of savings
may be inaccurately assessed by consumers due totheir myopic expectations.
For the dynamic welfare effects shown in Table 5 we evaluate the instan-
taneous utility function (u)from equation (1). We report thesum of
present valueanaloguesof compensatingvariationsusing these utility
functions. Thismeasurereflects the amountin1973 dollars which would
have to be given to the twelve consumer groups to leave them indifferent
between the present tax system and the tax integration plan.
Results in Table 3 indicate that the efficiency gain from equal-
izing capital taxes by industry is about $8.7 billion per year in 1973
dollars. The single—period change inthereal after—tax income of each
ofthe twelve consumer classes is presented in Table48 The efficiency
gainturns out to be distributed in such a way that every group experiences
anincrease in real income, and thus a Pareto improvementoccurs.9 Dynamic
gains in this case (Table 5)are $340billion,whichis about 0.8 percent
of the discounted present value of the future U.S. income stream after
correction for population growth. We have calculated but do not report
percentage changes in price and in output by industry for this replacement
andfor each tax plan. Other information on new capital and labor useby
industry,taxes paid, and all types of demands are available for each tax
replacement)0 The findings for each of the .integration plans are as
follows:
Plan 1: Total Integration: This plan removes only part of
industrialdiscrimination in the taxation of capital income because property
taxesremain as differential capital taxes by industry. Intertemporal







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































iynamic WelfareEffects in Present Value of Compensating
Variations over Tjme*
(in billions of 1973 dollars)
TaxReplacement Types of Scaling to Preserve Tax Yield
Scale Comin Rate
Equal capital tax 339.273
rates on industry (.808)***
Plan 1 Lump_sum** Multiplicative** Additive**
Full integration 404.f+58 179.977 229.966
with indedng (.963) (.429) (.548)
Plan 1
Full integration 350.164 175.094 213.588
without indedng (.834) (.417) (.509)
Plan 2
Dividend deduction from 195.666 113.810 131.327
corporate income tax (.466) (.271) (.313)
Plan 2
With extreme behavior 414.722 179.858 232.322
assumption (.987) (.428) (.553)
Plan3
Dividend deduction from 175.449 113.413 121.736
personal income tax (.418) (.270) (.290)
Plan 3
With extreme behavior 284.630 158.464 185.367
assumption (.678) (.337) (.441)
Plan 4
Dividend 139.558 96.305 105.335
Gross—up (.332) (.229) (.251) *
Thesemeasures involve calculating a sequence of mentary equilibria through
time with incrementofthe capital and labor service endowments of the economy through
savings and population growth. We considere_ui1ibria at 10 year periods with an
appropriate treatment of the terminal conditions. The dynamic compensating variations
are analogues of static concepts applied to the consumption sequence over time assuming
the first period discount factor is unchanged.
**
Theseare explained in the text.
The numbers in parentheses represent the gain asapercentage of the present discounted value ofwelfare (consumption plus leisure) in the base squence. This
valueis $42 trillion for all comparisons, and accounts for only a population the size
of that in 1973.25
asdescribedearlier, such that taxes are scaled up tomeettax revenues
fromthe corresponding period of the previous tax regime. We consider
lump—sum adjustments to income taxes along with additive and multiplicative
scaling of marginal income tax rates.
Interindustry discrimination is reduced enough to provide a $6
billion static welfare gain ineach year (in 1973 dollars) for the cases with
eithermultiplicative or additive scaling and inflation indexation of capital gains
taxes. Without this price level correction, the efficiency gains are
slightlyless. Dynamic gains are sensitive to the replacement yield
preserving tax considered. With lump—sum replacement a gain of $404
billion occurs, and with multiplicative scaling a gain of $180 billion
occurs. These figures are to be compared with a $42 trillion discounted
present value of the future income stream for the U.S. economy under the
present tax system (after correction for population growth, in 1973 prices).
The sensitivity of these dynamic results to the replacement tax can be
explainedby the positive correlation between income andproportion of
incomesaved. Since multiplicative scaling collects more tax revenue
from high—income groups, it creates a greater distortion in their inter—
temporalchoices.
Staticequity effects provide progressive gains to income brackets,
shownin Table 4, with every class enjoying increased real income. The
importance of the structure of the replacement yield preserving tax is
apparent from Table 4, multiplicative scaling helping lower—income groups
substantiallymore.
We do not need to consider changes in financial policies under this
plan. With full integration, all forms of capital income are taxed26
identically. Since the tax does riot depend on whether capital inco
is paid in interest, dividends, or retained, a change in either the
debt/equity or dividend/retention ratio will not alter the new effective
tax rates or the new f1 for the revised equilibrium calculation. The
resulting solution would thus be the same even if the ratios changed.
Plan 2: Dividend Deduction from Corporate Income Tax Base: Here
dividends are treated like interest for tax purposes, and we first assume
thatcorporations continue to retain the same portion of income. The
reduction of the corporate income tax base causes some levelling of
capital tax rates and a resulting $3 billion increase in yearly national
income. Dynamic gains der multiplicative scaling of tax rates are $114
billion. Under a lump—sumreplacement,dynamic gains are $196 billion.
The reduced spread of dynamicresultsis due to the smaller revenue loss
associated with Plan 2: there is less distortion of intertemporal choice
through scaling. The static distributional impacts are disadvantageous
tothe higher—income groups, reflecting the fact that less income is
taxed at the flat corporate rate and more at the progressive personal rates.
Under our "standard" treatment of Plan2, dividend/retention ratio
is assumed constant even though there does exist an incentive to replace
retained earnings with now non—taxed dividends. For this reason we also
consider the extreme case where all corporate earnings are distributed.
The corporate income tax would thus be effectively eliminated, and
calculations would proceed on the assumption that all corporate earnings
get multiplied by the higher .96 for Thestatic gain for such a tax
replacement is around $6 billion per year, the same as under Plan 1; the
dynamic gains are also comparable. These welfare gains are substantially
abovethe fixed—behavior estimate because corporate decision makers have,27
in effect, reduced the distortion of the corporate income tax with its
differing effective capital tax rates. The static distributional results
of the Plan 2 extreme—behavior case show nre progressive gainsamong
consumers.
Plan 3: Dividend Deduction from Personal Income Tax Base: The
reduced tax on dividends again implies lower tax rates on heavily incor-
poratedindustries and a levelling of all rates in general. This occurs
through the lower ffordividend paying industries. Static welfare
gainsare about $2 billion per year; dynamic gains under multiplicative
scaling are about the same as Plan 2, at$113billion, but under lump—
sumreplacement are lower than Plan 2, at $175 billion. The multi-
plicative results reflect the importance ofthededuction fromtheupwardly
scaledincome tax. As might be expected, Table 4 shows that Plan 3 has
re regressive effects than the second plan, since dividend income is
all taxed at the corporate rates instead of being taxed atprogressive
personal tax rates.
-
Underextreme financial policy behavior, where firms no longer
retainearnings, both the static and dynamic gains are somewhat
larger. The corporate tax remains the same, but newf1 include all
corporate earnings as dividends with aof zero. Less corporate income
is subject to the personal income tax. The •difference betweenresults
with and without the extreme—behavior assumption is lessthan for Plari 2
because the personal income tax deduction does lessto eliminate interindustry dis—
crimination than does the corporate income tax deduction of dividends.
Equity effects are still regressive for the extreme—behavior case.28
Plan4: Dividend "Gross Up": All plans that decrease the
corporate income tax only on dividends canbetermed partial integration
plans. The fourth plan, because it reduces only part of the tax on
dividends, might be called a partial—partial plan. The tax system is
changed to a lesser degree, and the static welfare gain is small, at
$2.8 billion per year. Dynamicgainsunder multiplicative scaling are
$96 billion, under additive scling are $105 billion, and under a lump—
sumreplacementare $140 billion.12 Equity effects are closer to pro-
portional thanunder Plan 1, but with smaller gains.
Perhaps the most interesting of our results for alltheintegration
plansare the dymamic results which suggest significant potential gains
from corporate tax integration, provided replacement taxes do not exces-
sively interfer with intertempora.1. consumption choice. There appears to
be a trade—off between achieving progressive or proportional income gains
through multiplicative scaling and maximizing the dynamic efficiency
gain: the largest intertenoral gain could be secured by taxing the
poorwho do not save.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed four alternative plans for corporate
and personal income tax integration in the U.S. by using a recently con-
structed medium—scale general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy and
taxsystem. The paper includes a brief discussion of the model and its
use of data, in addition to outlining characteristics of the integration
plans and their representation in model equivalent form..
Total integration of personal and corporate income taxes is shown
to yield static efficiency gains of $6 billion per year using 1973 data;29
and the present value dynamic gainsrange from $414 billion to
$96 billion in 1973 prices, depending on the yield preserving
tax. Dividend deductibility from either the corporate income
tax or the personal income tax results in a static efficiency
increase of slightly less than half of the gains from full
integration. A 15 percent dividend gross—up scheme yields
somewhat less than dividend deduction from the corporate tax but
a little more than deduction from the personal income tax. The
distributional impacts vary among plans; full integration with
a multiplicative scaling of marginal income tax rates to preserve
tax yields is shown to imply a progressive change in the distri-
bution of real income even though every class is better off.
Dividend deductibility from the personal income tax is shown to
have a beneficial impact slightly more advantageous to high—income
groups, while dividend deductibility from the corporate income
tax redistributes from high to low income groups. The dividend
gross—up plan is roughly proportional. In the sensitivity of
dynamic gains to the yield preserving tax we find an interesting
result. It suggests that the potential gains under integration
from removal of intertemporal distortions would be significantly
reduced if marginal income tax rates are raised, particularly if
the higher—income groups, who are also largersavers, face larger
tax rate increases.30
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1. The competitive model implies net of tax rates of return on capital
are equalized across industry. In a situation where capital tax
rates vary by industry, this equalization requires that the gross
marginalproductivity of capital differ among the industries. The
efficiency gain accomplished by reducing the differential capital
tax rates isdue to the reallocation of capital towards industries
where it is more productive.
2. A 15 percent credit was often mentioned and is modelled here. A
further possibility discussed was that differential credits might
be given depending on the industry in which a company operates; this
is not modelled.
3. Future extensions of this approach could disaggregate labor into
skill types since these might have different rates of substitution
for capital. Similarly, capital could eventually be broken down
into land, equipment and structures, or some other useful definitions.
4. Earler data sets of this type for the U.K. have been used by Whalley
(1975) and Piggott and Whalley (1977).33
5.In order to capture the tax exempt nature of saving through pensions,
Keoghplans,Individual Retirement Accounts, andlifeinsurance, we
model a 30% savings subsidy within the income tax framework. This
proportion reflects data from Flow of Funds accounts. Another 20%
of savings through owner occupied housing is also taxed on an
expenditure tax basis, indicating that the U.S. is approcLniately
half—waybetween income and expenditure taxation. Housing tax
preferences are also captired by the model as discussed below.
6. 1976 Tax Expenditures, U.S. Congress.
7. Operation of the equal yield calculation is discussed in Shoveri and
Whalley (1977).
8. Because of the general equilibrium nature of these calculations,
both sources and uses effects are included in the Table 4
distributional results. The rental price of capital rises in the
simulated equilibrium. Low—income consumers tend to purchase outputs
of lightly—taxed, capital—intensive industries like housing, agriculture,
and petroleum. Thus the uses side of income has some regressive
effects. On the sources side, note that the capital/labor ratio of
income from our data is bowl—shaped over income groups. This is
largely due to their age structure. Since our model calculates a
long—runequilibrium, where homogeneous capital is reallocated
among industries, the new higher return to capital is earned by all
capital owners regardlessof their original portfolio. The higher
priceof capital causes bowl—shaped gains on the sources side of
income.
9.Although the simulated equilibrium is a Pareto improvement over the
benchmark 1973 equilibrium, we have said nothing about the possible
paths between the two. Short—run losses and transition costs should34
beconsidered before enacting such a change. Our sodel is essentially
comparative static and does not measure these disequilibria or
temporary influences.
10. This additional information is available from the authors onrequest.
11. The U—shaped gains of the additive replacement can be explained by
the higher return to capital in the simulated equilibrium. The
capital/laborratio of ino is greatest for the low—income (retired)
individualsand again for high—inco individuals.
12. Here, again, the spread between the dynamic welfare gains is less
than that of full integration because this plan involves smaller
revenueloss than full integration. Multiplicative scaling makes
upmost revenue from high—income, high—saving consumers, and it
thus reduces future capital stocks and incomes. The dynamic lump—
sum and additive cases show that the dividend gross—up does
substantiallyless to improve interindustry resource allocation
than other plans.